


The figure of (daytime) talk show presenters as generators of opinion, persuasion and political media focus in Spain

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Abstract

This study examines the role of talk show presenters in Spain as key actors in the generation of public opinion and the mediation of the political sphere. Traditionally, the weight of public opinion on television has fallen on evening news and late-night debate programmes; however, the prolonged political polarization and the permanent ongoing campaign environment have shifted this conversation to daytime entertainment formats, where talk shows deal explicitly with political issues. The research analyzes four television formats and the role of their presenters during the campaign days of the European elections 2024: TardeAR (Tele5), Al Rojo Vivo (La Sexta), Espejo Público (Antena 3) and Todo es Mentira (Cuatro). A critical analysis methodology was used to analyze the content of the thematic approach, persuasive techniques, language and political conflicts dealt with. Likewise, it has been evaluated how the presenters' interventions influence the construction of the political agenda and the molding of public opinion. The results offer clear conclusions on how the presenters and, by extension, the formats, exert a notable influence on the audience's political opinion, consolidating their role in the media agenda and underlining the importance of greater ethics and informative transparency. At the same time, it highlights the need for diversity of opinion to foster a pluralistic debate and enrich the current media landscape.

Keywords: daytime talk shows; television; public opinion; gate-keepers; presenters

Resum. *La figura dels presentadors de magazins (diürns) com a generadors d'opinió, persuasió i focus mediàtic polític a Espanya*

Aquest estudi examina el paper dels presentadors de programes magazins a Espanya com a actors clau en la generació d'opinió pública i en la mediació de l'esfera política. Tradicionalment, el pes de l'opinió pública televisiva ha recaigut en els informatius i els programes de debat nocturns; tanmateix, la prolongada polarització política i l'ambient de campanya constant han desplaçat aquesta conversa a formats d'entreteniment diürns, on els magazins aborden qüestions polítiques de manera explícita. La investigació analitza quatre formats i el paper dels seus presentadors durant els dies de la campanya de les eleccions europees de 2024: *TardeAR* (Tele5), *Al Rojo Vivo* (La Sexta), *Espejo Público* (Antena 3) i *Todo es Mentira* (Cuatro). S'ha emprat una metodologia d'anàlisi crítica dels continguts centrada en l'enfocament temàtic, les tècniques persuasives, el llenguatge i els conflictes polítics tractats. Així mateix, s'ha avaluat com les intervencions dels presentadors influeixen en la construcció de l'agenda política i en el modelatge de l'opinió pública. Els resultats ofereixen conclusions clares sobre com els presentadors i, per extensió, els formats exerceixen una influència notable en l'opinió política de l'audiència consolidant el seu paper en l'agenda mediàtica i subratllant la importància d'una major ètica i transparència informativa. Alhora, es posa de manifest la necessitat d'opinions diverses per fomentar un debat plural i enriquir el panorama mediàtic actual.

Paraules clau: magazins diürns; televisió; opinió pública; *gate-keepers*; presentadors

Resumen. *La figura de los presentadores de magazines (diurnos) como generadores de opinión, persuasión y foco mediático político en España*

Este estudio examina el papel de los presentadores de programas magazines en España como actores clave en la generación de opinión pública y en la mediación de la esfera política. Tradicionalmente, el peso de la opinión pública televisiva ha recaído en los informativos y programas de debate nocturnos; sin embargo, la prolongada polarización política y el ambiente de campaña constante han desplazado esta conversación a formatos diurnos de entretenimiento, donde los magazines tratan cuestiones políticas explícitamente. La investigación analiza cuatro formatos y el papel de sus presentadores durante los días de la campaña de las elecciones europeas de 2024: *TardeAR* (Tele5), *Al Rojo Vivo* (La Sexta), *Espejo Público* (Antena 3) y *Todo es Mentira* (Cuatro). Se ha empleado una metodología de análisis crítico de los contenidos sobre el enfoque temático, las técnicas persuasivas, el lenguaje y los conflictos políticos tratados. Asimismo, se ha evaluado cómo las intervenciones de los presentadores influyen en la construcción de la agenda política y en el moldeado de la opinión pública. Los resultados ofrecen conclusiones claras sobre cómo los presentadores y, por extensión, los formatos ejercen una notable influencia en la opinión política de la audiencia, consolidando su papel en la agenda mediática y subrayando la importancia de una mayor ética y transparencia informativa. A su vez, se destaca la necesidad de opiniones diversas para fomentar un debate plural y enriquecer el panorama mediático actual.

Palabras clave: magazines diurnos; televisión; opinión pública; *gate-keepers*; presentadores

1. Introduction

Studies on political communication traditionally focus on the representation of information in specialized media formats (Soengas-Pérez et al., 2023). Analyses of the circulation of political messages on social networks are also common (Cano-Orón et al., 2021; Gamir-Ríos et al., 2022), with a particular predominance of studies on X (Twitter) (Campos-Domínguez et al., 2022). Television debates, as formats specific to electoral campaigns and political communication, have similarly attracted researchers' interest (López-García et al., 2021; Lava Santos, 2021). While TV infotainment programmes have received some attention from academia (Peris-Blanes & López-Rico, 2017), they remain comparatively under-explored.

There is a perception that social networks have replaced traditional media as information channels. However, many studies indicate the opposite. Television, especially, continues to influence the political concerns of the general public (Casero-Ripollés & Rabadán, 2013). This reinforces the hypothesis that the current hybrid system of media outlets (Chadwick, 2013) interacts within a context of complex communications (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2011). This fact would explain, in turn, what has been called the “echo chamber” effect (Löblich & Venema, 2021) that occurs between the media and social networks, and the verified evidence suggesting the existence of information disorders (Wardle, 2018; Peirano, 2019).

Television continues to be the medium that audiences prefer as a source of information (Marín, 2017). Almost 60% of the Spanish population consider that it is the medium that offers the greatest credibility (Masip et al., 2020) and trust as a source of information (Uteca, 2023) and the one to which the majority turn in times of crisis (López-Rico et al., 2020). In addition, the television industry has adapted to take advantage of the new communication technologies (Wang, 2016), which partially explains why it maintains its influential capacity. It follows that television continues to occupy a central place, at least among a significant proportion of the public.

The key question is to what extent these programmes have evolved and how far the hybridization of information and entertainment formats has progressed in the context of political communication (Peris-Blanes & Llorca-Abad, 2017). On the one hand, the theory of journalistic genres clearly distinguishes between the functions of information journalism and of opinion journalism, along with their respective subgenres (Gomis, 2008). According to Arroyas & Berná (2015: 58), “the difference [...] between the [information and opinion] genres does not lie in the interpretative nature of one as opposed to the other, but in the varying levels of interpretation required.” On the other hand, there is an observable advance of models in which information, opinion and entertainment become increasingly intertwined.

Concurring with Cage et al. (2022), Jiménez (2020: 54) argues that on television “the selection of participants [on a political talk show] is closer to

the selection criteria of a reality show than to one of current affairs and rigor.” And the problem is not that the journalist gives his opinion “but that he does not provide enough elements [to the viewer] to distinguish where information ends and opinion begins” (Burgueño, 2008: 74). In the face of this deliberate confusion, the Habermasian public sphere is weakened (Livingstone & Lunt, 1994). The shift to the realm of the personal dilutes the separation between the public and private spheres and leads us to an emotional public sphere (Richards, 2010) in which feelings and the private determine political action.

It is the triumph of so-called infotainment (Ferré-Pavia, 2013) and of the television of intimacy (Sibilia, 2008) for all formats, including those of pure entertainment. Hanner (2003: 4) notes: “Advertising, entertainment and news have become a single force”. Magazine programmes and talk shows are the catwalk of the new politics of emotions, and they commonly include political information and political figures (Peris-Blanes & Llorca-Abad, 2017: 344) who comment on aspects of current affairs or talk about their private lives. What from our point of view is unusual is the importance that magazine programmes and daytime talk shows have acquired in shaping public opinion, even though the incorporation of political content into morning shows has been gradually occurring since at least 1997 (Reguero-Sanz & Martín-Jiménez, 2020: 20).

In this situation, what role does the presenter play? Bourdieu (1996: 33) noted that presenters set themselves up as representatives of the audience: “The moderator appears to be interrupting an intelligent speech to speak for the ‘dummies’”. This would suggest that not all guests are treated equally (Ibid.). From a more recent perspective, Shah et al. (2016) argue that the aggressiveness these presenters employ plays a significant role in their interruptions. Baviera et al., (2019) suggest that the public’s interest in political information lies in stimulating their emotional reactions. This is achieved by focusing the partisan confrontation in the most ideological and polarized way possible (Ibid.).

The presenter openly takes part in how the conversation proceeds (Peris-Blanes & Pérez-Sánchez, 2020: 74) and the way he handles the conversation has an ideological bias (Vraga et al., 2012). This bias is aligned with the editorial orientation of the programme and affects how the guests contribute to the discussion (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016). These editorial orientations are in some cases clearly identifiable: Antena 3 takes a more conservative editorial line, while La Sexta exhibits a more progressive line. However, Cuatro and Telecinco are channels with more ambiguous or de-ideologised editorial lines. The presenter is also responsible for the emotional intensity and success of the programme (Haarman, 2000) and his personality takes on different roles, as this contributes to shaping a distinctive personality for the programme (Vraga et al., 2012).

Our research is framed within different paradigms of communication theory. First, agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972): the media shape

our agenda of current affairs priorities. Second, framing (Goffman, 1974): the media condition us to have an unbiased view of current affairs. And third, Gerbner's (1998) cultivation theory: the probability that viewers will believe what is depicted on television is proportional to the time they are exposed to it, something that is particularly important in relation to the loyalty of audiences of magazine programmes and talk shows. To the extent that the information bias of the media is measurable (Rodrigo-Ginés et al., 2024), so is the ideological bias of the presenters (Cage et al., 2022).

2. Methodology

This study examines the content of four Spanish independent television programmes classified as magazine programmes or daytime talk shows: *Todo es mentira* (TEM) (Cuatro), *Espejo Público* (EP) (Antena 3), *TardeAR* (TAR) (Tele 5), and *Al Rojo Vivo* (ARV) (La Sexta). Our focus was on understanding the role of the presenter as an opinion leader: Risto Mejide, Susanna Griso, Ana Rosa Quintana and Antonio García Ferreras, respectively. The selection of these programmes was based on two criteria: first, to include two programmes that are broadcast in the morning and two in the afternoon; and second, to cover 100% of the country's independent generalist television channels. The sample was taken from the 2024 European election campaign period (from 25 May 2024 to 9 June 2024), yielding a total of 11 full broadcasts per programme, referred to as work units. To obtain meaningful results, we implemented a qualitative methodology combining content analysis with conversational praxis analysis.

In the first phase, a literature review was conducted on the role of magazine programmes and talk shows in shaping public opinion, as well as on news coverage during election periods. As previous research has demonstrated (Cronin et al., 2008: 39), heuristic analysis of the information obtained through such a review facilitates the more precise formulation of research questions, the inclusion or exclusion of relevant research criteria, and the prevention of researcher bias. This review builds on previous studies to establish new findings and enables the development of new theories and/or conceptual models within the framework of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 101). This inductive approach supports the creation of conceptual models based on data collection, analysis of emerging patterns, and iteration of the process when necessary. Operating within a constructivist framework, this method enables reflective practice in addressing complex problems that may be "puzzling, unsettling and uncertain" (Schön, 1983: 40). It also aligns with the design thinking paradigm proposed by Cross (2006) and others.

Next, the work units were subjected to a quantitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2016). All programmes were studied using the audiovisual content analysis technique described by Krippendorff (2004), based on theoretical coding and an ad hoc open coding. For this

purpose, a table with 28 thematic categories was designed, adapted from the research of Marín, Pérez-Sánchez & Pop (2021). The initial inter-coder test was performed independently by three researchers on 20% of the work units (N=8) of the total corpus (N=44). These were randomly selected and proportionally distributed according to the specific corpus of each case (TEM N=2, EP N=2, TAR N=2 and ARV N=2). Reliability calculation was performed using ReCal3 0.1 software (Freelon, 2013). The mean Krippendorff's Alpha coefficient obtained is $\alpha=0.87$. In parallel, a discourse critique analysis (Van Dijk, 2009) was carried out in relation to the style, tone and content of the presenters' interventions. We thus examined how moderators use language to influence viewers' perceptions. In addition to the number of interruptions, we established whether the presenter moderated or gave opinions.

Finally, the following research questions were posed: Q1. Do daytime magazine programmes and talk shows contribute to the shaping of public opinion? Q2. Is there a clear distinction between current affairs and strictly political content? Q3. Are the European elections a central topic during campaign days? Q4. Do the programme hosts moderate or give opinions? The objectives of the research were also defined:


- O1. To identify the most recurrent themes in relation to political information.
- O2. To define the extent of the presenters interventions.
- O3. To identify the ideological positioning of the format.

3. Results

3.1. *Todo es Mentira*

This is an afternoon programme broadcast by the channel Cuatro and presented by Risto Mejide. It is defined by its humorous analysis of "fake news, clickbait and other hoaxes that flood the news pages".¹ The programme's standard format involves the presence of a co-presenter, Marta Finch, two comedians and two contributors. The latter systematically represent an ideologically right-wing position (= the PP party) and a left-wing position (= the PSOE party). It is rare (less than 10% of the time) to find contributors ideologically located beyond these positions. The format, on average 132 minutes long, does not contain a fixed section on politics, but on average at least 77% of the analyzed content of the total number of work units deals with political issues. In the period under study, the European elections are discussed, but on almost all occasions in a tangential manner. On only one occasion did we detect that a campaign proposal was addressed explicitly.

1. <<https://www.cuatro.com/todoesmentira/>>. The translation of the program's motto is ours.

Figure 1. Topics mentioned in the different programmes

Source: Author's own work.

In terms of political issues, nearly all are related to national politics. Of particular significance are topics concerning national political leaders (47 mentions) and attacks on political opponents (35 mentions). In addition, other issues with a national focus also have particular significance: Catalonia and independence in all its forms (40 mentions), corruption (33 mentions), and the judicialization of politics (18 mentions). We identified 20 mentions of possible post-electoral pacts and polls, all of which are linked to potential agreements between the PP, currently leading in the polls, and Meloni's far-right party (19 mentions), as well as the erosion of the PSOE's voter intentions, framed within a national context. Social issues such as housing (1 mention), rights and freedoms (2 mentions), and gender-based violence (1 mention) are notably lower down in the programme's list of priorities.


In contrast to other programmes analyzed, the presenter allows guests and co-presenters to express themselves at length. His interventions and/or interruptions, 12 on average in each programme, tend mainly to moderate. He restricts expressions of opinion to occasional moments when he is the only one speaking. These opinions are mostly framed within a left-wing ideological spectrum. However, there are some more subtle patterns that are worth mentioning. In the 6 June broadcast, the programme devoted 45 minutes to discussing the alleged corruption case of Begoña Gómez, the wife of the president of the government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez. Meanwhile programme dedicated only five minutes to discussing the self-confessed corruption case of Alberto González, boyfriend of the president of the Autonomous Community of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso. At the same time, the presenter frequently expresses himself in terms that trivialize politics, democracy and the legitimacy of electoral processes; which represents a dangerous discourse of unchallenged attack on the institutions of social cohesion.

3.2. *Espejo Público*

This is a morning programme on Antena 3, presented by Susanna Griso. It is defined as a current affairs programme for following “interviews, analysis and the latest news”.² The standard format of the programme involves the regular presence of four contributors. These co-hosts usually represent two right-wing positions (=PP) and two left-wing positions (=PSOE). Here, too, it is also rare (less than 10% of the time) to find contributors ideologically located beyond these positions. The format, with an average duration of 209 minutes, does not contain a pre-defined section on politics, but devotes an average of 65% of its content to political issues. In the period analysed, the European elections are discussed, but at no time are European proposals or issues discussed or analysed.

Regarding political issues, a clear pattern emerges that mirrors the trends observed in other programmes. Only issues relating to national political leaders (44 mentions) and attacks on the opposition (41 mentions) are deemed significant. Catalonia and the independence movement generate considerable attention (44 mentions), followed by corruption (27 mentions) and fascism (32 mentions). Mentions of the war in Gaza (25 mentions) are also noteworthy, though always framed within an analysis or criticism of the government’s foreign policy actions. The economy gains some prominence (14 mentions), while social issues remain largely sidelined in terms of coverage: education (2 mentions), climate change (1 mention), and unemployment (4 mentions).

2. <<https://www.antena3.com/programas/espejo-publico/>>. The translation of the program’s motto is ours.

Figure 2. Political bias and the number of times presenters express their opinion per programme

Source: Author's own work.


The role assumed by Susanna Griso is clearly interventionist. This is not so much due to the number of interruptions observed in the conversational analysis (an average of 16 per programme), but rather because of their content. The presenter appears to function as just another co-host, clearly leaning to the right, particularly towards arguments that favor the PP. We were particularly struck by the fact that, on some occasions, she even mumbles her opinions when a contributor expresses something with which she disagrees. Regarding other notable details, when analyzing controversial issues relating to the government or to prime minister Pedro Sánchez, the left-wing expert guests are also not favorable. For instance, in the 7 June broadcast, Susana Díaz was the guest representing the left-wing bloc. On international matters, particularly those involving extreme-right populist leaders (such as Javier Milei or Giorgia Meloni), the tone remains notably neutral.

3.3. *Al Rojo Vivo*

This is a morning programme broadcast by La Sexta, presented and directed by Antonio García Ferreras. The programme focuses on current affairs, specializing in political news and events. It follows a consistent structure, featuring regular journalists from the channel, such as Diana Mata, as well as a diverse range of contributors who change frequently depending on the day. Some of them, like Pablo Montesinos or Sandro Pozzi, appear daily. Typical-

ly, the co-hosts represent a balance between three right-wing positions (=PP) and three left-wing positions (=PSOE/SUMAR/PODEMOS). Additionally, the programme features connections with other contributors from different newsrooms, many of whom hold clear ideological stances. In this case, it is common to find contributors positioned to the left of the PSOE, but never beyond the right of the PP. The format, which has an average duration of 217 minutes, primarily focuses on national politics and international conflicts, with approximately 74% of its content dedicated to political issues. During the period analyzed, the programme discussed the European elections, dedicating significant time to discussions about the far-right in Europe. However, it included little to no analysis of European proposals or issues, except for one instance.

Figure 3. Ideological position of the commentators on average per programme



Source: Author's own work.

As for political issues, a similar pattern to the other programmes emerges. Mentions of the politicization of justice are particularly significant, with 50 mentions. The second most mentioned topic is the war in Gaza (43 mentions), followed by another international conflict, the war in Ukraine (32 mentions). Attacks on the opposition (25 mentions) and Catalan independence (22 mentions) are national issues that are addressed similarly. Topics more directly related to the European elections include post-electoral agreements and polls, with 24 mentions, often linked to discussions of fascism or the far right at the European level (20 mentions). Political leaders and corruption each garnered 19 mentions. The remaining topics discussed were

largely superficial and sporadic. It is worth noting that the structure of *Al Rojo Vivo* continually shifts between topics during the programme, often returning to previously discussed subjects, with all of these transitions being clearly sign-posted.

The role assumed by Antonio García Ferreras is somewhat ambiguous, as during most of the programme, he acts as a moderator without expressing his opinions. However, at certain moments, he clearly shares his views. This is evident from the fact that he rarely interrupts to voice his opinion, instead focusing on facilitating the conversation. Throughout his interventions, Ferreras generally appears to align more with left-wing positions, particularly in support of arguments that benefit the PSOE. It is notable that, in the broadcast of 29 May, while other programmes criticized Pedro Sánchez in relation to the Begoña Gómez case, Ferreras emphasized the “peculiarity” of the judicial case.

3.4. *TardeAR*

This programme airs in the afternoon slot on TeleCinco. It is presented and directed by Ana Rosa Quintana and is largely dedicated to “celebrity gossip” or the so called “pink press”, although it also covers current affairs, particularly social issues and events. The structure of the programme generally begins with current affairs, soft news or international celebrity coverage, and features a panel of five contributors who alternate depending on the day. In the second part of the programme, the focus shifts entirely to network celebrities or “celebrity gossip”. The few contributors who occasionally comment on political issues typically represent one or two right-wing positions (PP) and one or two left-wing positions (PSOE). Commonly, we find contributors ideologically aligned with the PSOE (such as Susana Díaz), though not ones who are directly associated with Pedro Sánchez, and the PP (such as Cristina Cifuentes). However, at times, these contributors don’t even engage in political discussions. The format, which lasts an average of 138 minutes excluding commercial breaks, devotes only about 3% of its content to political issues. This is mainly due to a few days dedicated exclusively to “Ana Rosa’s charges against Sánchez”.³ During the period analyzed, there was no mention of the European elections.

Regarding political issues, this programme stands apart from the others. The mention of political leaders is particularly prominent, especially in the context of accusing president Pedro Sánchez of lying. Although the most frequently discussed topic is housing (with two mentions), other issues have also been addressed, including climate change, the politicization of justice and the independence movement. These last three topics are always discussed in the context of direct criticism of the president of the government.

3. This is the exact phrase that is the title of the *TardeAR* program broadcast on Mitele.es on 05/29/2024. <https://www.mitele.es/programas-tv/tardear/2024/programa-174-40_012571236/player/>.

The role assumed by Ana Rosa Quintana is clearly one in which she expresses her opinions, as she consistently does so throughout her programmes. It is evident from her various interventions that she is firmly positioned on the right, mainly in opposition to the PSOE, with a particular focus on criticizing Pedro Sánchez. To provide some concrete examples, during the period analyzed, it became common for her to accuse the president of lying in relation to “the Begoña Gómez case” or issues surrounding Catalan independence, or to compare Taylor Swift’s trips on the “Falcon” to those of Pedro Sánchez. In some instances, we have also noted comments from the presenter that resemble rhetoric commonly associated with the right and far-right, such as: “Squatters are protected by the law.” For these reasons, by the end of the analysis, it is clear that the presenter’s opinions align with the right-wing.

4. Discussion and conclusions

This article focuses on four daytime magazine programme and talk show formats from the country’s private generalist television channels. Together, they represent 100% of the available formats, providing a comprehensive analysis of four approaches that, in principle, are balanced in terms of their ideological positioning. However, the results demonstrate that this is not the case in practice. Not only is there a blend of genres that shifts between entertainment and information, but the presenters also play a key role in blurring this distinction. Future research should expand to include an analysis of TVE, as well as of regional public broadcasters. Given the nature of public television, which is influenced by different factors in relation to its editorial stance, the study should also introduce nuanced research questions and objectives.

The results of this article confirm that daytime magazine programmes and talk shows clearly contribute to shaping or influencing public opinion (Q1). Three of the programmes analyzed (EP, TEM and ARV) structure their agendas around political issues, dedicating most of their time to analyzing them through co-hosts and contributors who are clearly ideologically identifiable. Only in one case (TAR) does the presence of political issues remain tangential. Continuing with this distinction, EP, TEM and ARV clearly separate the treatment of political and non-political topics (Q2). This separation is harder to establish on TAR due to the programme’s inherent characteristics, which are typical of communication complexity (Delli Carpinini & Williams, 2011). The analysis also reveals that none of the four programmes showed particular interest in the European elections during the campaign period (Q3). The study further demonstrates that the presenters are clearly influenced by partisan and/or ideological leanings (Q4), as in all four cases they make space to express their own opinions. This supports our view that the programmes each have a particular ideological perspective and clearly shows a closed, pre-established position that tends to reinforce mainly negative emotions.

In relation to the research objectives, the study shows a clear focus on political issues relating to national politics (O1): party leaders, attacks on the opposition, independence, corruption and the far right. Other social issues are not given attention and are clearly relegated to the background. With regard to the nuances introduced in the analysis, the role of the presenters is clearly interventionist (O2), reinforcing homogeneous positions, intensifying polarization, and diminishing exposure to diverse perspectives, an effect closely related to the dynamics of echo chambers (Löblich & Venema, 2021). The presenters all express their opinions in one way or another, contributing to reinforcing the ideological slant of the programme (O3) in terms of its editorial line. The programmes attempt to maintain a supposed balance of co-hosts from different ideological backgrounds. However, it would be more accurate to describe this as partisanship. With very few exceptions, the panelists on EP, TEM, and TAR reflect party-aligned ideologies limited to those of the PP and PSOE. Only in the case of ARV are positions to the left of PSOE (Sumar and Podemos) represented. During the period analyzed, we did not detect the presence of contributors further to the right of the PP, although there are many issues on which there is agreement (such as post-electoral pacts or immigration).

Given the approach taken in this study, it is important to emphasize once again that the European elections did not receive attention in the programmes. Only in the case of ARV was there some interest, mainly linked to the rise of the far right in Europe. The rest of the topics were analyzed from a national perspective. ARV is a political talk show format, so the distinction between political and non-political topics was clear, though more subtle to establish. For opposite reasons, in the case of TAR, the presenter takes advantage of any topic, political or not, to introduce her opinion or criticism of the government, putting forward a right-wing ideological position. EP is a programme that is clearly hostile to any approach opposed to the thesis of right-wing parties, especially those of the PP. Finally, in the case of TEM, we can identify the programme with a left-wing ideological context, but with a tendency to discredit and delegitimize the country's democratic institutions. In all four cases, priority is given to what is called "journalism of statements", which in no case helps clarify the facts relating to the subject matter being addressed.

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